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Dennis v. Higgins: Commerce Clause "Rights" Actionable
Under Section 1983
Since the Revolution, Americans have resisted unfair taxation by
the government, on both the federal and state levels. Plaintiffs challeng-
ing discriminatory state taxes traditionally have alleged that the state
conduct in question is a direct violation of the Constitution itself.1 With
Dennis v. Higgins,' however, these plaintiffs now have an alternative
weapon with which to attack such conduct: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In Den-
nis, plaintiff brought a Commerce Clause4 claim under section 1983, ar-
guing that Nebraska's attempt to use its taxing power in retaliation
against him for basing his operations in another state violated his "right"
to participate freely in interstate commerce.5 The plaintiff's innovative
and successful implementation of section 1983 marks a significant turn-
ing point in the life of the statute, which is normally found in the arsenal
of civil rights plaintiffs. First, foregoing a constitutional claim and pro-
ceeding under section 1983 entitles a prevailing plaintiff, such as Dennis,
to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988,6 relief previously unavailable to
individuals relying on traditional causes of action to combat Commerce
Clause violations.7 Second, the result in Dennis may finalize the conver-
sion of section 1983 from an obscure remedy for state-sponsored viola-
tions of a few constitutional guarantees8 into an enforcer of any claim
1. See, eg., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 556 F. Supp. 740, 742-43 (S.D.
Iowa 1983) (alleging a Commerce Clause violation), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). General federal question jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1988).
2. 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The clause provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." Id.
5. Dennis, Ill S. Ct. at 867.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section[] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
7. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
8. Only 21 cases were decided under § 1983 between 1871 and 1920, the first 49 years of
the legislation's existence. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate
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arising under a constitutional provision, such as the Commerce Clause,
that merely allocates power between the federal and state governments.
Just as the Commerce Clause restricts state activity in the area of inter-
state commerce, other Article I provisions restrict state activity in the
areas of intergovernmental taxation, foreign relations, import duties, and
immigration.9 After Dennis each of these prohibitions on state action is a
possible source of section 1983 claims.
The plaintiff in Dennis was not the first to take this route. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dennis to resolve a
split among the circuits regarding the viability of Commerce Clause
claims under section 1983.10 Using a framework of analysis developed in
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,11 the Dennis Court held
for the first time that a plaintiff may bring an action for Commerce
Clause violations under section 1983.12
This Note places Dennis in historical context by tracing the develop-
ment of section 1983 as a potent remedy for those deprived of their indi-
vidual rights by state action.13 It criticizes the majority for failing to
explain adequately why an expansive reading of section 1983 was proper,
and finds its dismissal of the dissent's version of the statute's legislative
history unconvincing.14 The Note also determines that use of the Golden
State framework to ascertain whether statutory provisions are within the
scope of section 1983 is inappropriate for analyzing the Commerce
Clause. 15 It argues that the dissent correctly recognized a distinction be-
tween constitutional provisions that secure individual rights and those
Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). Indeed, the statute's apparent dormancy
during this period forced a cautious Court to articulate its assumption that the statute had not
been repealed. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485 (1903) ("We assume that [§ 1983]...
has not been repealed .... "); Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900) ("assuming
[§ 1983] is still in force"). For a discussion of the limited number of guarantees § 1983 pro-
tected, see infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
10. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. A number of commentators had anticipated
the Court's grant of certiorari on this issue. See Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Im-
plied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1551 (1989);
Gregory A. Kalscheur, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Protect-
ing the Right to Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 86 MICH. L. REv. 157, 158 (1987); Henry
P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
233, 260 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REv. 129,
340 (1990).
11. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
12. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 873.
13. See infra notes 76-133 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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that allocate power.16 It also identifies the significance of making the fee-
shifting provisions of section 1983 available to Commerce Clause plain-
tiffs and explains why this is contrary to congressional intent.1 7 Finally,
the Note explores the potential effects of the decision 8 and recommends
legislative action to curb the adverse consequences.' 9
The plaintiff in Dennis operated a multistate trucking company
based in Ohio.20 Because Nebraska imposed certain taxes and fees only
upon vehicles registered in Ohio and other specified states, 21 plaintiff filed
a class-action suit in Nebraska state court challenging the taxes on the
grounds that they constituted an unlawful burden on interstate com-
merce.22 Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and a refund of all taxes paid.23
Significantly, the plaintiff also included a claim that the State was liable
under section 1983,24 seeking recovery of his attorney's fees and costs. 25
After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the court held that the Nebraska
taxes and fees violated the Commerce Clause.26 Although the trial court
permanently enjoined the State from assessing or collecting the taxes and
fees, it dismissed plaintiff's section 1983 claim.27 Plaintiff appealed the
dismissal of his section 1983 claim to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.28
Affirming the dismissal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that
"[d]espite the broad language of § 1983 ... there is no cause of action
under [it] for violations of the commerce clause."'29 The Nebraska court
believed that incidental benefits inuring to individuals as a result of allo-
16. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
20. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 867.
21. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-305.02-.03 (1984), amended by NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 60.305.02-.03 (1988).




26. Id. The taxes and fees at issue violated the Commerce Clause because they were im-
posed only on motor carriers whose vehicles were registered outside Nebraska. Id.; cf. Lewis
v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court applies a per
se test of invalidity to state statutes that directly discriminate against out-of-state participants
in interstate commerce).
27. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 867-68. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to prove he was
entitled to judgment under § 1983. See Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. 427, 429, 451 N.W.2d 676,
678 (1990), rev'd sub nom. Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991).
28. Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678; see Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 868.
29. Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678. The Supreme Court of Ne-
braska relied heavily upon the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel. Id.; see Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d
1139, 1143-44 (8th Cir.) (holding that Commerce Clause claims are not cognizable under
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cations of regulatory power by the Commerce Clause were not the type
of interests Congress sought to protect in section 1983.30 Plaintiff subse-
quently petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari, which the Court granted to resolve the conflict on this issue among
the federal courts of appeals. 31
In an opinion by Justice Byron White, the Court reversed the
Supreme Court of Nebraska's refusal to find a cause of action for Com-
merce Clause violations under section 1983.32 In the first section of the
opinion, Justice White noted that while section 1983 was designed origi-
nally to ensure primarily "'a right of action to enforce the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant
thereto,' "3 the Court had not restricted the statute to that limited pur-
pose.34 Instead, it had construed section 1983 broadly, giving full effect
to the statutory language, which speaks of "any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws."'35
Justice White then proceeded to determine whether the Commerce
§ 1983 because the clause merely allocates power between the federal government and the
states and does not secure any individual rights), cert denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
30. Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. at 431-32, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
31. Dennis, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). The Supreme Court of Nebraska noted this division of
authority. See Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678. The Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits had held that no § 1983 cause of action could arise for Commerce Clause viola-
tions. See Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 1989); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of
Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1985); Kassel, 730 F.2d at 1143-44. The Courts of
Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits reached the opposite result. See Continen-
tal Ill. Corp. v. Lewis, 838 F.2d 457, 458 (1lth Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S.
472 (1990); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1982); Kenne-
cott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980). Nor was this the first time the Court
had considered granting a writ of certiorari on this issue. See Private Truck Council of Am.,
Inc. v. Quinn, 476 U.S. 1129, 1129 (1986) (White, J., joined by Brennan and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari and noting split among the circuits).
32. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 868. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Souter joined Justice White's opinion. Id. at 867.
33. Id. at 869 (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 611
(1979)). While Justice White agreed with the dissenting justices that the legislative history of
§ 1983 clearly reflected its original purpose, id., he criticized them, however, for creating a
"cut-and-paste" legislative history to support their assertion that § 1983 does not apply to
constitutional provisions that allocate power. Id. at 868 n.4. For a discussion of the dissent's
rejoinder to this criticism, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
34. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 869.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (emphasis added); see Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 869-70 (quoting
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (holding that § 1983 "pro-
vide[s] a remedy... against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights"), and
citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 6-8 (1980) (refusing "to limit... section 1983 to civil
rights or equal protection laws") and Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972)
(rejecting an attempt to limit the constitutional rights encompassed by the phrase "rights,
privileges, or immunities")). For further commentary on Monell, Lynch, and Thiboutot, see
infra notes 109, 113-17, and 120 and accompanying text.
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Clause creates a "right" within this expansive reading of section 1983.36
Acknowledging that the Commerce Clause is a power-allocating provi-
sion37 that gives Congress preemptive authority over the regulation of
interstate commerce,38 Justice White concluded that it also does more:
"[I]t is also a substantive 'restriction on permissible state regulation' of
interstate commerce. ' 39 Moreover, Justice White observed, individuals
injured by impermissible state regulation may successfully obtain injunc-
tive and declaratory relief.' The combination of a substantive restriction
on state power and an entitlement to relief under the Commerce Clause,
the Court held, constitutes a "right" within the purview of section
1983.41 To bolster his position, Justice White cited a number of Supreme
Court precedents that describe the Commerce Clause as conferring
36. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 870-71; see infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
The question of what rights the Commerce Clause imparts is implicit in the two main
types of claims that may arise under the Commerce Clause. One variety includes challenges to
state commercial statutes or regulations that have been preempted directly or indirectly by
existing federal schemes. See, eg., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824)
(striking down a state law granting an exclusive ferry franchise because of direct conflict with
applicable congressional regulation). The Supremacy Clause resolves such direct conflicts in
favor of federal law. See, eg., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913) (ruling that
federal food and drug laws override conflicting state law). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the preemption of state
law by federal law when direct conflicts between federal programs and state actions arise).
The second type of claim challenges the power of the states to enact specific statutes or
regulations that unduly impair interstate commerce, even when Congress has not exercised its
power to enact any conflicting statutes or regulations. See, eg., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (finding that state statute prohibiting out-of-state banks and hold-
ing companies was implicitly limited by Commerce Clause). This type of challenge was at
issue in Dennis, and is usually referred to as the "dormant Commerce Clause" problem. See,
e-g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984) (holding that dor-
mant Commerce Clause prohibits state law requiring in-state timber to be processed prior to
export). See generally Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982) (discussing the origins of this terminology). Under the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine, courts evaluate the validity of state regulations affecting interstate com-
merce by balancing the "desirability of permitting diverse responses to local needs [against] the
undesirability of permitting local interference with ... the unimpeded flow" of goods between
the states. TRIBE, supra, § 6-4, at 407.
37. The Supreme Court of Nebraska accepted defendant's argument that the Commerce
Clause merely allocates'power between the federal and state governments and therefore does
not confer "rights." See Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. 427, 431-32, 451 N.W.2d 676, 678 (1990),
rev'd sub nom. Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991). Justice Kennedy's dissent relied, in
part, on this argument. See Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 874 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); infra notes 58-
75 and accompanying text.
38. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 870.
39. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
40. Id. at 870-71 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
110 S. Ct. 2238, 2247 (1990)).
41. Id. at 871.
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"rights" in various contexts.42
Justice White also discussed Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles,43 which set forth the current test for determining whether a
federal statute confers a "right" within the scope of section 1983.4
Under Golden State, the Court must consider whether Congress intended
the provision,4" in this case a constitutional rather than a statutory one,
to benefit the plaintiff.4 Under this test, the Commerce Clause confers
rights within the scope of section 1983 if the framers intended it to bene-
fit individuals in addition to promoting national economic union.47 Jus-
tice White pointed to the history of Commerce Clause interpretation
cited in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission 48 to support his
conclusion that the framers intended the Commerce Clause to benefit
individuals who have suffered injury as a result of impermissible state
regulation of interstate commere.4 9
Finally, Justice White considered two additional arguments the
State raised.5 0 The first analogized the Commerce Clause to the
Supremacy Clause,5 noting that the Court previously had held that the
Supremacy Clause does not confer any rights within the purview of sec-
42. Id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 321 n.3 (1977)
("right under the Commerce Clause"); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967)
("right[] of constitutional stature"); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216
U.S. 1, 26 (1910) ("substantial rights of those engaged in interstate commerce"); Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891) ("To carry on interstate commerce is... a right [to] which
every citizen... is entitled .. .
43. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
44. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 871. The test is discussed infra notes 118-27 and accompanying
text.
45. The other two Golden State considerations are: (1) whether the provision in question
creates obligations binding on the governmental unit or merely expresses a congressional pref-
erence for certain kinds of treatment, and (2) whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is
too vague or amorphous to be enforceable by the judiciary. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106. In
Dennis, the State did not dispute that these two considerations weighed in favor of recognition
of a right. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 871-72.
46. Dennis, II S. Ct. at 872.
47. Id.
48. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
49. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 872. In Boston Stock Exchange the Court held that regional
stock exchanges challenging a state transfer tax were within the "zone of interests" protected
by the Commerce Clause. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 321 n.3. Justice White also relied
upon the Court's "repeated references to 'rights' under the Commerce Clause." Dennis, 111 S.
Ct. at 871 (quoting Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (engaging in interstate
commerce is a "right[ ] of constitutional stature"); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel.
Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 26 (1910) (referring to "the substantial rights of those engaged in inter-
state commerce"); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891) ("To carry on interstate
commerce is... a right which every citizen ... is entitled to exercise ... .
50. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 872.
51. Id.
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tion 1983.52 Justice White rejected the analogy on the grounds that the
Commerce Clause is a source of federal rights, in contrast to the
Supremacy Clause, which merely affords priority over conflicting state
laws to federal rights created by other provisions of the Constitution.13
The State further argued that the Commerce Clause could not be a
source of rights within the scope of section 1983 because it is subject to
qualification or elimination by Congress.54 Justice White, rejecting this
argument, noted that the federal statutory rights protected by section
1983 under Golden State55 also could be qualified or eliminated by Con-
gress.56 For these reasons the majority allowed the section 1983 claim to
stand.
Justice Anthony Kennedy began his dissent criticizing the majority
for ignoring structural and historical factors that he considered critical.58
According to Justice Kennedy, the majority failed to recognize the im-
portant structural distinction between constitutional provisions that allo-
cate power and those that secure the rights of individuals against the
state.59 Because section 1983 was designed as a mechanism for protect-
ing individual rights, only violations of the provisions that secure those
rights should fall within its scope.' In support of the argument that the
Commerce Clause does not create such rights but rather allocates power,
Justice Kennedy cited the plain language of the Commerce Clause as
well as the intent of the framers.61 Even if the majority did not recognize
52. Id.; see Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989);
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979).
53. Dennis, I1 l S. Ct. at 872. Justice White distinguished the Commerce Clause from the
Supremacy Clause on the grounds that the former imposes substantive limitations on the abil-
ity of states to regulate interstate commerce, whereas the latter merely acts as a referee when
state and federal laws conflict. See id.
54. Id.
55. See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108.
56. Dennis, Ill S. Ct. at 872.
57. Id. at 873.
58. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Privileges and Immunities, Extradition, and Fugi-
tive Slave Clauses represent right-securing provisions in the original Constitution. See Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV). Justice Kennedy cited these clauses as
the only "provisions of the Constitution as first enacted... that secur[e] the rights of persons
'as between such persons and the states."' Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 69-70 (1871)). He also included the Reconstruction
Amendments and the Bill of Rights provisions incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
among the "individual rights" § 1983 was designed to protect. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 873-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("By its own terms... the Commerce Clause is
a structural provision .... It does not purport to secure rights."). Justice Kennedy argued
that both the events surrounding and the writings documenting the failure of the Articles of
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the distinction between power allocating and right securing, he con-
tended, it erred in refusing to acknowledge that the sponsors of section
1983 recognized it and specifically drafted the statute with this distinc-
tion in mind.62 Justice Kennedy, relying upon various statements made
by the supporters of section 1983 at the time of its enactment, 63 con-
cluded that "[t]he sponsors of § 1983 ... gave us a straight-forward an-
swer to the question of which constitutional violations give rise to a
§ 1983 action, and told us that violations of power-allocating provision
such as the Commerce Clause do not." ' According to Justice Kennedy,
rather than acknowledge Congress' unequivocal intent to limit the scope
of section 1983, the Court imposed its own expansive reading of the stat-
ute without adequate justification.65
Justice Kennedy then observed that no previous case that found a
violation to be within the scope of section 1983 had concerned a power-
allocating provision of the Constitution.66 Indeed, the only section 1983
case that involved a power-allocating constitutional provision found no
section 1983 cause of action.67 Justice Kennedy argued that the language
Confederation and the drafting and ratification of the Constitution evidenced the framers' pre-
occupation with creating an economic union. Id. at 875 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He found
no evidence of intent to secure personal rights under the Commerce Clause, Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at 874 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Section 1983 was originally enacted as § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)). While
debating the power of Congress to enact § 2 of the Act, which used the same "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" language of § 1, Representative Shellabarger, Chairman of the House
Select Committee which drafted the Act and Floor Manager of the bill, articulated a distinc-
tion between the provisions of the Constitution that allocate power and those that secure
rights. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 874 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., app. 69-70 (1871)). Justice Kennedy relied on this statement as evidence that the
drafters of § 1983 recognized this distinction and incorporated it into the statute. Id. at 874-75
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Bolstering this position, he observed that "[e]very specific mention
of the rights secured by the 1871 Act" refer to either the Privileges and Immunities, Extradi-
tion, and Fugitive Slave Clauses in Article IV sections or the rights secured by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. Id. at 875 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing statements made by other
Congressmen in debates on the 1871 Act). Justice White criticized the dissent's reliance on the
comments of Representative Shellabarger because they did not specifically address the scope of
§ 1983. See id. at 869 n.4.
64. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 876 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also noted that
the Court historically has "placed great reliance" upon legislative history in analyzing § 1983
problems. Id. at 874 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1972);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-85 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell,
436 U.S. 658 (holding that local governments may be defendants in § 1983 suits)).
65. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (Fourteenth Amend-
ment) and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939) (Fifteenth Amendment)).
67. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy referred to Carter v. Greenhow, 114
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in cases cited by the majority to support its finding of a "right" to engage
in interstate commerce represented nothing more than "scattered state-
ments... [that constitute] weak support for its conclusion." '68 Justice
Kennedy also rejected the majority's application of the test for the pres-
ence of a section 1983 right, set forth in Golden State Transit Co. v. City
of Los Angeles,69 because that case dealt with the search for rights se-
cured by mere statutes instead of rights secured by the Constitution. 0
Even if Golden State were applicable, Justice Kennedy indicated he
would reach the opposite result because the plaintiff in Dennis was an
incidental rather than a primary beneficiary of the Commerce Clause's
allocation of power.71
The final section of Justice Kennedy's dissent examined the implica-
tions of the majority's decision.72  At a minimum, Justice Kennedy
noted, the majority "creates a whole new class of § 1983 suits derived
from Article J.''71 Justice Kennedy described the majority's view of sec-
tion 1983 as "all-inclusive," meaning that it provides the potential for
creating a section 1983 cause of action for any violation of federal law. 74
The Court's decision also permits all future dormant Commerce Clause
plaintiffs an opportunity to recover attorney's fees under section 1988,
which Justice Kennedy believed clearly contradicts congressional
U.S. 317 (1885), which concerned an alleged violation of the Contracts Clause. See id. at 322,
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
68. Dennis, IlI S. Ct. at 877 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy believed that
none of the cases cited by the Court held that the Commerce Clause secures a personal right;
rather, he argued, they are merely examples of the Commerce Clause's power allocation at
work. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. 493 U.S. 103 (1990); see infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
70. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 873 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Golden State test, arguably
necessary in assessing whether any of the hundreds of [federal statutes] secure rights within the
meaning of § 1983, is not appropriate.., where the question is whether a right is secured by a
provision of the Constitution.").
71. Id. at 873, 877-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that the major-
ity had confused the concept of standing with that of a cause of action when it tried to charac-
terize the plaintiff as a primary beneficiary of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 878 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). He acknowledged that the Commerce Clause clearly gives rise to a legal interest in
an individual against injurious state regulation. Id. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This
interest in turn gives the plaintiff in Dennis standing to challenge the Nebraska taxes and fees.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, "[t]his ability... is not equivalent to finding a secured
right under § 1983. If that were so, all violations of federal law would give rise to a § 1983
cause of action." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 879-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that Article I prohibi-
tions upon state activity in the areas of intergovernmental taxation, state involvement in for-
eign relations, import duties, and immigration all were possible sources of § 1983 claims after
Dennis. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1992] SECTION 1983
intent.75
Dennis is the latest chapter in the disparate history of section 1983.
An examination of this history is useful in evaluating the significance of
the decision. The statute was enacted to complement the three Recon-
struction Amendments.76 The first Reconstruction amendment outlawed
slavery.7 7 The second guaranteed all persons the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizenship, due process, and equal protection of the laws.78 The
third prohibited governmental interference with citizens' right to vote.79
All three specifically authorize Congress to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the rights they secure. 0 Pursuant to this authority, Congress en-
acted the predecessor to section 1983 to bolster enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' In so doing, Congress responded to harass-
ment of freedmen and Union sympathizers by the Ku Klux Klan and
similar groups in the postbellum South82 and to the perception that state
75. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that most dormant Commerce
Clause challenges to state regulations come from well-financed business entities and industry
associations, and questioned the policy of making attorney's fees recoverable by such plaintiffs.
Id. at 879-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, eg., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 336 (1977) (upholding an agricultural association's challenge to North
Carolina advertising regulations that discriminated against out-of-state apple producers).
76. See generally THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 3-57 (3d ed. 1991) (giving a brief history of federal civil rights activity during
Reconstruction and discussing the Thirteenth Amendment, the Black Codes, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment).
77. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
78. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
79. Id. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
80. Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. See generally 7
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 132-55
(1987) (discussing legislation enacted during 1866-1872 to enforce the post-Civil War
amendments).
81. Section 1983 originated as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The legislation was entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes."
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version of cause of action provision
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
82. See Kalscheur, supra note 10, at 175-76 ("The 1871 Act was a response to the lawless
activities of the Klan and other vigilante groups harassing freedmen and Union sympathizers
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and local government officials were pursuing an official policy of inaction
towards these activities.8 3
To place Dennis in its proper context it is necessary to examine the
evolution of section 1983 jurisprudence. Victims of unconstitutional
state action rarely based claims upon section 1983 until the late 1930s.14
The multitude of explanations offered by commentators to explain this
period of dormancy 5 suggests that it was not due to any single factor,
but rather to a combination of all or most of them.
Between 1871 and 1920,86 a period Justice Blackmun has labelled
the "Dark Age of Civil Rights,"8 7 the Supreme Court gave the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an extremely nar-
row substantive scope.88 In The Slaughter-House Cases8 9 the Court held
that the Constitution secures only the rights of national citizenship. 9'
Examples of these rights of national citizenship include the right to vote
in federal elections, the right to petition, assert claims against, and be
protected by the federal government, and the right to travel freely within
in the South."); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1133, 1142-69 (1977) [hereinafter Section 1983 and Federalism].
83. Included in the 1871 Act was a jurisdictional provision that allowed access to federal
court regardless of the amount in controversy. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13
(current version ofjurisdictional provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1988)). See Kal-
scheur, supra note 10, at 176 ("Congress was primarily concerned with suppressing the Klan's
private lawlessness and preventing further abdication of law enforcement responsibility by
Southern officials pursuing a policy of official inactivity."); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra
note 82, at 1153-54 ("The legislators who proposed the bill saw themselves confronted not
with common felonies but with a concerted plan of organized violence.").
84. See Comment, supra note 8, at 363 (noting dearth of § 1983 cases prior to World War
II).
85. See, eg., Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights--Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.YIU. L. REV. 1, 3-20 (1985)
(attributing the dormancy to the Court's narrow interpretation of the Reconstruction amend-
ments and to congressional sentiments toward postwar reconciliation); Collins, supra note 10,
at 1495-96 (attributing dormancy to the availability of implied rights of action brought directly
under the federal question statute and attributing the resurgence of 1983 claims to the declin-
ing judicial recognition of these implied rights of action); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. Rv. 1323, 1336-43 (1952) (suggesting that
poor drafting of the Reconstruction amendments allowed courts to misconstrue statutes en-
acted to enforce them); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 82, at 1156-61 (attributing the
dormancy to popular apprehension about expansion of the federal government and apathy
toward the plight of freed slaves).
86. Comment, supra note 8, at 363.
87. Blackmun, supra note 85, at 11.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875) (noting that the
states' role as the primary guardians of rights between private persons was not altered by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
89. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
90. See id. at 79-80 (noting that the privileges of national citizenship include the right to
be protected by and to participate in the national government).
SECTION 1983
the nation.91 Because the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was so drastically confined, it follows that its
primary enforcement mechanism, section 1983, remained relatively un-
important and infrequently used.92
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, courts further limited
the utility of section 1983 with narrow constructions of the statute's spe-
cific provisions.93 To violate section 1983 under these restrictive con-
structions, a person had to deprive another of a federally secured right
while acting "under color of" a state statute or custom. 94 In early sec-
tion 1983 cases narrowly interpreting this provision, federal courts re-
quired the violative conduct to be sanctioned affirmatively by the state.95
Courts also adopted a confined reading of the statute's "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" language. The United States Supreme Court re-
stricted section 1983's scope to "civil rights only." 96 It excluded from
this scope certain "political" rights, such as the right to hold state office
and the right to vote in state elections. 97 The Court confined section
1983 further by limiting its reference to rights "secured by" the Constitu-
tion and laws. As one commentator has noted, "[a]ccording to the old
Court, the phrase ['secured by' served to] exclude[ ] rights that did not
*.. take their origin in or derive 'directly' from the Constitution or fed-
eral law." 98 Thus, the Constitution did not "secure" property rights for
purposes of section 1983 because they originated in the common law.99
The Equal Protection Clause did not "secure" rights under section 1983
because the laws challenged usually were of state origin. Ico Interests pro-
tected by the Contracts Clause met the same fate.10
91. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
92. See Collins, supra note 10, at 1504-05.
93. See generally id. at 1499-1506 (discussing the Court's narrow construction of § 1983's
language).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
95. See, eg., Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964, 965, 968 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (involving a
§ 1983 claim against a police chief who arrested and beat a suspect that was dismissed because
his actions were not authorized by the state).
96. Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900). "Civil rights" consisted of the right
to sue, to be sued, and to testify in state court; the right to make contracts; and the right to
buy, sell, and inherit property. See Collins, supra note 10, at 1500-01.
97. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 691 (1887); see also Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475, 497 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that political rights are not civil rights within
the meaning of the predecessor of § 1983).
98. Collins, supra note 10, at 1503.
99. See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Pollak, 272 F. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (Hand, J.)
("[Tihe general right of property does not have its origin in the Constitution .... ").
100. Collins, supra note 10, at 1503; see, eg., Holt, 176 U.S. at 72 (holding predecessor to
§ 1983 unavailable for equal protection challenge to state tax).
101. See, eg., Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (holding that Contract Clause
1992]
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The Court expanded the scope of section 1983 toward the end of the
1930s. In Hague v. CIO,1"2 Justice Stone read section 1983's jurisdic-
tional provision 10 3 to encompass "personal," but not "property,"
rights."° The "personal" right at stake was the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech;010 Hague therefore broadened section
1983's coverage to include violations of rights secured by the Bill of
Rights, which previously had been beyond its scope."ca
With Monroe v. Pape 107 the Court began what has been described as
the "modem era" for section 1983,108 holding for the first time, that ac-
tions by state officials not authorized by state law are actionable under
section 1983 if they involve misuse of state power.) 9 In Monroe the
plaintiff sought relief under section 1983 after thirteen Chicago police
officers entered his home without a search warrant and arrested him.10
The Monroe Court based its decision largely on the legislative history of
the statute. 11 Monroe is pertinent to Dennis because it was the first case
to rely heavily upon legislative history to determine the scope of section
rights were not within scope of predecessor to § 1983 because they were not "directly secured"
by the Constitution).
102. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (Roberts, J., plurality opinion).
103. See supra note 83.
104. Hague, 307 U.S. at 531-32 (Stone, J., plurality opinion).
105. Id. (Stone, J., plurality opinion).
106. The Court's narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), excluded the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 79-80 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protected only rights of
national citizenship). This in turn excluded those guarantees from the reach of § 1983 due to
its early intimate relationship with the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 81. As the
Court expanded the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment through incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause, see TRIBE, supra note 36, § 11-2, at 772-74, it was logical
for the amendment's enforcement mechanism, § 1983, to expand as well. See Collins, supra
note 10, at 1534.
107. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
108. See, eg., Collins, supra note 10, at 1537. Section 1983 was used sparingly during its
first 50 years. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
109. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85, 187 (violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights alleged
as a result of an unauthorized intrusion into plaintiff's home by police officer). But see Monell,
436 U.S. at 700 (concluding that cities do not "cause" constitutional deprivations within the
meaning of § 1983 unless their agents act pursuant to established custom or policy). Prior to
Monroe actions by state officials outside the scope of their authority were not actionable under
§ 1983. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964,
965-68 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (holding that beating by police officer was not actionable under
§ 1983 because it was not sanctioned by state law).
110. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170.
111. Id at 173-83, 188-91; id. at 194-201 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 225-37 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
SECTION 1983
1983.112
The Court continued to rely upon legislative history to discern the
scope of section 1983 in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 113 In Lynch a
creditor garnished a defaulting debtor's savings account under the provi-
sions of a Connecticut statute that authorized pre-judicial garnish-
ment.I 4 The debtor brought a class-action suit in federal district court
against the sheriffs who levied upon the accounts and the creditors who
invoked the statute.1" The defendants argued that 28 U.S.C § 1343(3),
the section giving a district court jurisdiction to hear a section 1983
claim, was unavailable to remedy this deprivation of property because
section 1983 addresses violations of "personal" rather than "property"
rights. 1 6 The Court rejected this distinction because no support for it
appeared in the legislative history.11 7 Lynch is significant because it illus-
trates the Court's persistent reliance upon legislative history to determine
the scope of section 1983.
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,118 however, the
Court abandoned its traditional deference to legislative history in section
1983 cases. In Golden State the city of Los Angeles was charged with
violating federal labor laws by conditioning the renewal of the plaintiff's
taxicab franchise on settlement of a pending labor dispute between the
plaintiff and its union." 9 The issue before the Court was whether the
federal statute in question granted the plaintiff rights enforceable under
section 1983.20 Justice John Paul Stevens developed a two-step func-
tional analysis to resolve this question. 2 ' The first step involves a three-
pronged test to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted the requisite
violation of a federal right:' 2 2 to constitute a "right," the interest as-
serted must create obligations binding on the governmental unit, as op-
posed to expressing a mere preference for certain kinds of treatment;' 23
112. See id at 172-85 (quoting extensively from congressional floor debates surrounding
enactment of the statute).
113. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
114. Id. at 539 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-329 (1961)).
115. Id. at 539-40.
116. Id. at 542.
117. Id. at 545-46.
118. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
119. Id. at 104.
120. Id. at 105. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), which held that the "and laws"
language of § 1983 was not restricted to civil rights or equal protection laws, § 1983 was ex-
tended to redress violations of federal statutory rights. Id. at 4-8.
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the right cannot be "'too vague and amorphous'" to be enforceable by
the judiciary;124 and Congress must have intended the statute violated to
benefit the plaintiff asserting the interest.125 The second stage of analysis
involves an inquiry into whether Congress has specifically foreclosed a
section 1983 remedy for the violation of the federal right asserted by the
plaintiff.126 If such a preclusion is found, the defendant will escape liabil-
ity under section 1983.127
Applying this test, Justice Stevens first observed that the case did
not come within any exception to a potential section 1983 remedy. 28 He
noted that because Congress had occupied the field of labor-management
relations to ensure equal bargaining power to each side,129 it intended
both parties to benefit from the provision. 3 The federal right created
was the right of each side to bargain with the other, free from govern-
mental interference.' 3 1 The city's refusal to renew the franchise impeded
the plaintiff's ability to exercise its statutory right.132 Thus, plaintiff had
an action under section 1983.133 Golden State therefore developed the
necessary framework for testing whether a specific federal statute secures
a right within the scope of section 1983.
With the Court's recognition of a section 1983 cause of action for
violations of the Commerce Clause, Dennis finalizes the transformation
of section 1983 from a narrow remedy for deprivations secured by the
Reconstruction amendments to a broad remedy available for vindication
of state officials' violations of many federal rights, statutory or constitu-
tional. This transformation eliminates any remaining doubts about the
scope of section 1983 and vests a new category of plaintiffs with causes of
action under the statute. The Golden State functional test, developed to
determine whether a statute secures a right within the meaning of section
1983, now applies with equal vigor to the Commerce Clause.
The Dennis majority reaffirmed the notion that an historical inquiry
into the legislative intent behind section 1983 will not be dispositive.
124. Id. (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987)).
125. Id. This requirement has been referred to as the "intended to benefit" test because it
attempts to identify the class of individuals Congress sought to protect when it enacted the law
in question. See Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
126. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 108-09.
129. Id. at 109. Justice Stevens was referring to Congress' decision to regulate affirma-
tively, and thereby preempt, the subject. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 109-10.
132. Id. at 112.
133. Id. at 112-13.
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Although the initial focus of the statute was to ensure a right of action to
enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Dennis Court
announced that it has "never restricted the section's scope to the effectu-
ation of that goal." '134 The majority neglected to explain fully why this
expansive reading was proper, even as it reaffirmed its previous broad
reading of section 1983.135 In addition, the opinion criticized the dissent
for creating a "cut and paste" version of history to support its arguments
to the contrary,1 36 but dismissed the dissent's attempt to ascertain the
intent of the statute's drafters by reference to their comments in a differ-
ent, but related, context.1 37
Apparently dismissing as irrelevant any distinction between rights
conferred by constitutional provisions and those conferred by statutory
provisions, and ignoring two prongs of Golden State's first test,'13 the
Dennis majority applied only the Golden State test's troublesome individ-
ual benefits analysis: was the Commerce Clause designed to benefit indi-
viduals and thus vest them with "rights" within the scope of section
1983? 1'" The State argued in Dennis that the Commerce Clause was not
designed to benefit individuals, but rather to "promote national economic
and political union" by allocating power."4 Justice White rejected this
argument, reasoning that since plaintiff, as a participant in interstate
commerce, fell within the "zone of interest" protected by the Commerce
Clause, he had a right secured by the Constitution within the purview of
134. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 869.
135. See id. at 868-70.
136. Id. at 869 n.4.
137. See id. at 875 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did not rely upon the
comments of Representative Shellabarger as definitive evidence of the scope of § 1983. Id. If
such an argument was made, the majority's dismissal of it would be appropriate because the
comments Justice Kennedy quoted did not specifically address § 1983. See supra note 63.
Rather, Justice Kennedy drew an inference from the comments made during debate on the
section of the Act of 1871 that followed § 1983 that the sponsors of § 1983 understood and
recognized a distinction between the power-allocating and rights-securing provisions of the
Constitution. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 875 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority rejected
Justice Kennedy's inference, arguing that if Congress recognized such a distinction "it would
have made [it] explicit." Id. at 869 n.4. But their rejection ignores Justice Kennedy's position
that the distinction was so obvious to the drafters that there was no need to make it explicit.
138. The first two prongs of the Golden State test were acknowledged by the Dennis Court,
but were not analyzed, as they were not disputed by the respondent. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 869
n.4. The first two elements of the Golden State test are: "[1.] whether the provision in ques-
tion creates obligations binding on the governmental unit ... [and 2. whether t]he interest the
plaintiff asserts... [is] 'too vague and amorphous' to be 'beyond the competence of the judici-
ary to enforce.'" Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)
(quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)). For a
discussion of the entire Golden State test, see supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
139. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 871-72.
140. Id. at 872.
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section 1983.141 The Court left unexplained how the plaintiff's status
within the "zone of interest" of the Commerce Clause conferred an indi-
vidual right of constitutional stature.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy relied upon the same historical argu-
ments that had failed to persuade the Golden State majority,' 42 but in
Dennis his position was stronger because the case involved a constitu-
tional provision. In Justice Kennedy's view, constitutional provisions
that allocate power between the states and the federal government differ
fundamentally from those that create individual rights.'43 The evidence
he offered that the drafters of section 1983 understood this distinction
and simply did not intend the statute to embrace incidental benefits aris-
ing from the constitutional division of regulatory power' 44 is convinc-
ing."'45 As Justice Kennedy adroitly observed, the Court had no need to
develop an "ahistorical test"' 46 to determine whether a limited number
of constitutional provisions give rise to a right within the scope of section
1983 because "[t]he sponsors of § 1983 . . . gave us a straightforward
answer to the question of which constitutional violations give rise to a
§ 1983 action, and told us that violations of power-allocating provisions
such as the Commerce Clause do not."' 47
Perhaps the most significant ramification of Dennis is the availability
of the extraordinary attorney's fees provision of section 1988148 to a class
of plaintiffs that Congress never envisioned having access. 4 9 Although
141. Id.
142. See id. at 873-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 873 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Alexander Hamilton likely would have agreed
with Justice Kennedy. In The Federalist Papers, Hamilton responded to those who opposed
the Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights. He argued that a bill of rights would be
redundant given the individual rights already secured by various provisions of the Constitu-
tion. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 510-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (guaranteeing the writ of habeas corpus); id. art. I, § 9, cl.
3 (prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (forbidding titles of
nobility); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (providing the right to trial by jury)). Hamilton described these
provisions as "[i]ndependent of those which relate to the structure of the government." Id.
(emphasis added).
144. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 874-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 137.
146. Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 873 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 876 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Section 1988 gives a court discretion to grant "reasonable" attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party in any action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986
(1988). See also infra note 150 (pointing out that this type of additional remedy traditionally
has not been available for dormant Commerce Clause claims).
149. Courts historically have treated dormant Commerce Clause claims as suits that arise
under federal law and that are thus actionable in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988). See Collins, supra note 10, at 1551 (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 72-73, 101
(1897) (upholding plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause claim under federal question jurisdic-
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the majority ignored the fee-shifting implications of its decision, the dis-
sent dealt with them in detail. 50 The usual candidates for fee-shifting
are victims of civil rights violations, who are unlikely to seek judicial
remedy because of limited economic resources. In contrast, the typical
dormant Commerce Clause plaintiff is a business person or entity en-
gaged in a substantial enterprise."' Clearly, the risk that Commerce
Clause violations may go unchecked because of the inability of these
plaintiffs to afford counsel is minimal. Yet Dennis ensures that they will
receive the same fee incentives as any impoverished victim of civil rights
violations arising from state action. This amounts to a federally spon-
sored financial incentive to challenge state commercial regulations.
As Justice Kennedy observed, states' traditional reliance upon com-
mercial transaction taxes and usage fees mean that attacks of this nature
could threaten their fiscal integrity." 2 States may respond by avoiding
these sources of revenue, even if the possibility of successful challenge is
remote. Such avoidance, however, will inhibit efforts by the states to
respond creatively to the substantial reduction in federal funding that
occurred during the Reagan Administration. Moreover, this phenome-
non is not limited to taxation; state environmental, labor, and safety reg-
ulations also affect interstate commerce. Reduced federal regulation in
these areas has, in some cases, resulted in more vigorous regulation at the
state level.' 53 Motivated by the possibility of recovering attorney's fees,
tion); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 115 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1885) (dormant Commerce
Clause claim arose under Constitution for purposes of appeals statute, but did not involve right
secured by the Constitution); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1146-
47 (8th Cir.) (providing no entitlement to attorney's fees for prevailing party in a dormant
Commerce Clause suit), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984)). Section 1331 has no fee-shifting
feature.
150. Justice Kennedy observed that:
* In the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress authorized the award of attorney's
fees to prevailing parties in, inter alia, § 1983 litigation. The award of attorney's fees
encourages vindication of federal rights which, Congress recognized, might otherwise
go unenforced because of the plaintiffs' lack of resources and the small size of any
expected monetary recovery. Congress was reassured that § 1988 would be "limited
to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a category of cases in which attorneys
[sic] fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate."
Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 879-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 1001, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5912).
151. For example, the plaintiff in Dennis was a motor carrier operating in several states.
Id. at 867.
152. Id. at 880 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. Compare Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (establishing a strict, joint and
several liability scheme for landowners whose property is contaminated by hazardous sub-
stances, but excluding in § 9601(14) petroleum discharges from definition of "hazardous sub-
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affected businesses may seek to dampen this vigor with Commerce
Clause challenges to objectionable state regulations.
Dennis may enkindle section 1983 litigation on other structural pro-
visions of the Constitution. The Commerce Clause appears in Article I
of the Constitution, which defines the powers of Congress and limits the
powers of the states.1 4 After Dennis, any violation of the Article I limi-
tations on state powers conceivably could give rise to a section 1983 ac-
tion. 5' Thus, an individual could bring a section 1983 action when a
state interferes with the federal power over foreign relations,5 6 applies
an unauthorized import duty, 57 disrupts federal immigration powers,1 58
or attempts to tax a federal obligation. 5 9 As long as the prospective
plaintiff is an incidental beneficiary of the constitutional provision in
question, there is little to stop him from filing a section 1983 claim.
The Court's expansion of section 1983's scope may prompt a con-
gressional response. Three options present themselves. One is to limit
the statute's scope by amending it. Either a specific prohibition against
its use in actions based upon the Commerce Clause or a broader limita-
tion upon its use to enforce claims based upon the structural constitu-
tional provisions would be effective. Another option is to amend the fee-
shifting provision in section 1988. Although the statute makes fee
awards discretionary, most courts have found the plaintiff's ability to pay
an irrelevant factor in making such awards.16 Here, Congress could ex-
plicitly authorize consideration of a plaintiff's ability to pay. The third
option is to make section 1988 available only in section 1983 cases in-
volving civil rights claims. Eliminating the availability of attorney's fees
would substantially reduce the incentive for pursuing Commerce Clause
claims under section 1983. Plaintiffs would still be able to proceed under
section 1331, which gives federal district courts jurisdiction to hear cases
stances") with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to 215.104 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (establishing a
similar scheme of liability for discharges of hazardous substances, and specifically including in
§ 143-215.94A(7) petroleum discharges in its definitions).
154. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I.
155. See Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156. Article I, § 10 of the Constitution sets out a prohibition, inter alia, on the entry by
states into agreements with foreign powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
157. See id. The limitations on states' powers extend to "lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage"
without congressional consent. Id.
158. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to "establish a Uniform Rule of
Naturalization").
159. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (granting Congress the power to "borrow money on the credit
of the United States").
160. See Collins, supra note 10, at 1563 (citing DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 233 n.1
(2d Cir. 1985); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 999 n.7 (5th Cir. 1983); and Metcalf v.
Borba, 681 F.2d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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arising under federal law.161
In Dennis the Court put a new gloss on a century-old statute.
Granted, there was a need for a framework to identify the statutes that
secured a right within the meaning of section 1983. Golden State pro-
vided it. Use of this framework was inappropriate in Dennis, however,
because the Commerce Clause was not intended to secure "rights." It
was meant to allocate power. The Court's holding to the contrary is
perplexing, and its explanation unconvincing. Perhaps it felt constrained
by the line of twentieth-century cases that have steadily broadened the
scope of the statute. But where is the limit? Any allocation of power will
cause the incidental benefits arising from it to ebb and flow as Congress
exercises its power. That is precisely why the Golden State framework is
an unreliable mechanism to identify the interests section 1983 was in-
tended to protect. Clearly, Congress can no longer rely upon the Court
to clarify the boundaries of section 1983.
BRIAN THOMAS ATKINSON
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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